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Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)D. Mishra, D.C. Parkes
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDSE14
ISBN-13978B000PDSE19
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations.
Description:
Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations.
