Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions [An article from: Decision Support Systems]
Book Details
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDT5ZI
ISBN-13978B000PDT5Z7
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank11,716,302
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Decision Support Systems, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Single item auctions are by far the most common auction format, but they are not always efficient. Combinatorial auctions are beneficial, when complementarities exist between the items to be auctioned. There are, however, several problems with the implementation of combinatorial auctions. Firstly, they are computationally challenging. Secondly, in combinatorial auctions it is difficult for bidders to know what kind of bids to place, since the winning bids complement each other. We consider a progressive electronic procurement situation with a monopsonistic buyer. We propose a decision support tool for iterative e-auctions generating suggestions for bids that would be among the current winners of the auction. We have tested the mechanism and report on the results.
Description:
Single item auctions are by far the most common auction format, but they are not always efficient. Combinatorial auctions are beneficial, when complementarities exist between the items to be auctioned. There are, however, several problems with the implementation of combinatorial auctions. Firstly, they are computationally challenging. Secondly, in combinatorial auctions it is difficult for bidders to know what kind of bids to place, since the winning bids complement each other. We consider a progressive electronic procurement situation with a monopsonistic buyer. We propose a decision support tool for iterative e-auctions generating suggestions for bids that would be among the current winners of the auction. We have tested the mechanism and report on the results.
