![When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution? [An article from: International Review of Law & Economics]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0PD/bigB000PDTHEM.jpg)
When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution? [An article from: International Review of Law & Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)G. Dari-Mattiacci, G. De Geest
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDTHEM
ISBN-13978B000PDTHE2
MarketplaceCanada 🇨🇦
Description
This digital document is a journal article from International Review of Law & Economics, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Insolvency is usually blamed for inducing injurers to take too little precaution. However, it has also been shown that insolvency may induce potentially insolvent injurers to spend more on precaution than is socially desirable. There may be two reasons to take excessive precaution. On the one hand, insolvent injurers may find it cheaper to take precaution than solvent ones; in fact, today's expenses on precaution may reduce the assets available for tomorrow's liability. On the other hand, it may be optimal for insolvent injurers to substitute precautions that reduce the probability of accidents (and, hence, of liability) for precautions that reduce the magnitude of the harm (which they partially externalize on victims). Under what conditions will they do so? Among other results, we show that over-precaution may only occur with probability precautions and not with magnitude precautions.
Description:
Insolvency is usually blamed for inducing injurers to take too little precaution. However, it has also been shown that insolvency may induce potentially insolvent injurers to spend more on precaution than is socially desirable. There may be two reasons to take excessive precaution. On the one hand, insolvent injurers may find it cheaper to take precaution than solvent ones; in fact, today's expenses on precaution may reduce the assets available for tomorrow's liability. On the other hand, it may be optimal for insolvent injurers to substitute precautions that reduce the probability of accidents (and, hence, of liability) for precautions that reduce the magnitude of the harm (which they partially externalize on victims). Under what conditions will they do so? Among other results, we show that over-precaution may only occur with probability precautions and not with magnitude precautions.
