![Exploitable actions of believers in the ''law of small numbers'' in repeated constant-sum games [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0PD/bigB000PDTKEE.jpg)
Exploitable actions of believers in the ''law of small numbers'' in repeated constant-sum games [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
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Book Details
Author(s)
S. Scroggin
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000PDTKEE
ISBN-13
978B000PDTKE2
Marketplace
France 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects' actions are sometimes exploitable because they are serially dependent. Subjects have difficulty in producing serially independent actions and in recognizing serially dependent sequences due to a bias called local representativeness.
Description:
In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects' actions are sometimes exploitable because they are serially dependent. Subjects have difficulty in producing serially independent actions and in recognizing serially dependent sequences due to a bias called local representativeness.
