Core tatonnement [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]

This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
Two discrete time tatonnement processes-one featuring successive tatonnement, the other featuring simultaneous tatonnement-for the core of coalitional games with transferable utility are introduced. For totally balanced games, the successive core tatonnement process corresponds to the standard simultaneous price tatonnement process of competitive equilibrium theory via the Shapley-Shubik (market game-direct market) correspondence. The simultaneous core tatonnement process is based entirely on the intuition behind the definition of the core for games with transferable utility, and it does not correspond to any evident competitive equilibrium tatonnement process. Both processes are proven to be globally stable. The two processes offer easily implementable algorithms for approximately computing core points.