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Network formation and stable equilibrium [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
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Book Details
Author(s)
C. Kim, K.-C. Wong
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000PDTKIA
ISBN-13
978B000PDTKI2
Marketplace
France 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We study the non-cooperative formation of a (directed) network that builds upon one-way immediate links. Our novel feature is that we require circular paths of links for productive activities. This captures more clearly the higher level of coordination that is often required for network formations than models such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky [A strategic model of social and economic networks, J. Econ. Theory 71 (1996) 44-74] and Bala and Goyal [A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1229], in that in our model a single agent's unilateral action is limited in affecting the network structure. We completely characterize the class of Nash equilibria by showing that the minimality of a graph is both necessary and sufficient (Theorem 1). We also propose the concept of a stable network that is similar to the pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We show that stable equilibria are a wheel, a trivial network, or a sub-wheel partitioned network (Theorem 2). We modify the Bala and Goyal (2000) dynamic process with inertia, and obtain the convergence to stable equilibria regardless of the initial state (Theorem 3).
Description:
We study the non-cooperative formation of a (directed) network that builds upon one-way immediate links. Our novel feature is that we require circular paths of links for productive activities. This captures more clearly the higher level of coordination that is often required for network formations than models such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky [A strategic model of social and economic networks, J. Econ. Theory 71 (1996) 44-74] and Bala and Goyal [A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1229], in that in our model a single agent's unilateral action is limited in affecting the network structure. We completely characterize the class of Nash equilibria by showing that the minimality of a graph is both necessary and sufficient (Theorem 1). We also propose the concept of a stable network that is similar to the pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We show that stable equilibria are a wheel, a trivial network, or a sub-wheel partitioned network (Theorem 2). We modify the Bala and Goyal (2000) dynamic process with inertia, and obtain the convergence to stable equilibria regardless of the initial state (Theorem 3).
