Dumping as a signal of innovation [An article from: Journal of International Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)K. Miyagiwa, Y. Ohno
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDTKQW
ISBN-13978B000PDTKQ2
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of International Economics, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period.
Description:
In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period.
