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To err on humans is not benign [An article from: Journal of Health Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)J.G. Zivin, A.S.P. Pfaff
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQYIBE
ISBN-13978B000RQYIB2
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Health Economics, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Concerns about frequent and harmful medical errors have led policy makers to advocate the creation of a system for medical error reporting. Health providers, fearing that reported information about errors would be used against them under the current medical malpractice system, have been reluctant to participate in such reporting systems. We propose a re-design of the malpractice system - one in which penalties are a function of the health provider's reporting efforts - to overcome this incentive problem. We also consider some alternatives to this mechanism that address two important ways in which reporting effort may not be observable: hospitals may have interests distinct from individual physicians and may not be able to observe their reporting efforts, and a regulatory agency or a court may not be able to adequately observe reporting efforts by a provider.
Description:
Concerns about frequent and harmful medical errors have led policy makers to advocate the creation of a system for medical error reporting. Health providers, fearing that reported information about errors would be used against them under the current medical malpractice system, have been reluctant to participate in such reporting systems. We propose a re-design of the malpractice system - one in which penalties are a function of the health provider's reporting efforts - to overcome this incentive problem. We also consider some alternatives to this mechanism that address two important ways in which reporting effort may not be observable: hospitals may have interests distinct from individual physicians and may not be able to observe their reporting efforts, and a regulatory agency or a court may not be able to adequately observe reporting efforts by a provider.
