Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment [An article from: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management]

This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
Minimum standards set by a 'World Environmental Organization' (WEO) and NGO labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO 'alternative' increases industry resistance to WEO proposals and this may reduce welfare. If, however, the schemes are run in parallel, existence of the NGO lessens producer opposition to WEO activities. This allows the WEO to be 'bolder' in its proposals, which is good for welfare.