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Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)G. Fibich, A. Gavious, A. Sela
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQZ5DY
ISBN-13978B000RQZ5D7
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.
Description:
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.
