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Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)
D. Levin, E. Ozdenoren
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000RQZ5KC
ISBN-13
978B000RQZ5K7
Availability
Available for download now
Marketplace
United States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA.
Description:
We investigate bidders' and seller's responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller prefers to conceal the number of bidders in the FPA, and prefers the FPA to the SPA.
