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Dynamic valuation: Preference changes in the context of face-to-face negotiation [An article from: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology]
Book Details
Author(s)J.R. Curhan, M.A. Neale, L. Ross
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQZ7TG
ISBN-13978B000RQZ7T5
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank99,999,999
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This experiment examines the dynamics of preference change in the context of face-to-face negotiation. Participants playing the role of ''student'' or ''financial aid officer'' exchanged proposals regarding the terms of a student loan. Consistent with dissonance theory, participants increased their liking for proposals they offered and/or ultimately accepted. The reactance theory prediction that participants would devalue proposals received from their opponents was confirmed for loan officers, but not for students. A pair of experimental manipulations involving the pre-rating of proposals and/or the opportunity for participants to engage in a brief discussion period prior to the initial exchange of offers mediated these effects, and influenced subsequent rates of agreement. Underlying attributional mechanisms and the implications of these findings for facilitating agreements are discussed.
Description:
This experiment examines the dynamics of preference change in the context of face-to-face negotiation. Participants playing the role of ''student'' or ''financial aid officer'' exchanged proposals regarding the terms of a student loan. Consistent with dissonance theory, participants increased their liking for proposals they offered and/or ultimately accepted. The reactance theory prediction that participants would devalue proposals received from their opponents was confirmed for loan officers, but not for students. A pair of experimental manipulations involving the pre-rating of proposals and/or the opportunity for participants to engage in a brief discussion period prior to the initial exchange of offers mediated these effects, and influenced subsequent rates of agreement. Underlying attributional mechanisms and the implications of these findings for facilitating agreements are discussed.
