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Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements [An article from: Journal of Financial Intermediation]
Book Details
Author(s)R. Repullo, J. Suarez
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQZCE6
ISBN-13978B000RQZCE2
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Intermediation, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.
Description:
We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.
