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Random paths to stability in the roommate problem [An article from: Games and Economic Behavior]
Book Details
Author(s)E. Diamantoudi, E. Miyagawa, L. Xue
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQZH14
ISBN-13978B000RQZH19
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Games and Economic Behavior, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generalizes those of Roth and Vande Vate [Econometrica 58 (1990) 1475] and Chung [Games Econ. Behav. 33 (2000) 206] under strict preferences.
Description:
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generalizes those of Roth and Vande Vate [Econometrica 58 (1990) 1475] and Chung [Games Econ. Behav. 33 (2000) 206] under strict preferences.
