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Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing [An article from: Games and Economic Behavior]
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Games and Economic Behavior, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We investigate multicast cost sharing from both computational and economic perspectives. Recent work in economics leads to the consideration of two mechanisms: marginal cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof. Subsequent work in computer science shows that the MC mechanism can be computed with only two modest-sized messages per link of the multicast tree but that computing the SH mechanism for p potential receivers can require @W(p) bits of communication per link. We extend these results in two directions. First, we give a group-strategyproof mechanism that exhibits a tradeoff between the other properties of SH: It can be computed with exponentially lower worst-case communication than the SH algorithm, but it might fail to achieve exact budget balance (albeit by a bounded amount). Second, we completely characterize the groups that can strategize successfully against the MC mechanism.
Description:
We investigate multicast cost sharing from both computational and economic perspectives. Recent work in economics leads to the consideration of two mechanisms: marginal cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof. Subsequent work in computer science shows that the MC mechanism can be computed with only two modest-sized messages per link of the multicast tree but that computing the SH mechanism for p potential receivers can require @W(p) bits of communication per link. We extend these results in two directions. First, we give a group-strategyproof mechanism that exhibits a tradeoff between the other properties of SH: It can be computed with exponentially lower worst-case communication than the SH algorithm, but it might fail to achieve exact budget balance (albeit by a bounded amount). Second, we completely characterize the groups that can strategize successfully against the MC mechanism.
