A polynomial-time Nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games [An article from: Decision Support Systems]

This digital document is a journal article from Decision Support Systems, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
With the increasing reliance on game theory as a foundation for auctions and electronic commerce, efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games are of great theoretical and practical interest. The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium for a one-shot bimatrix game is a well-known open problem. This paper treats a related but distinct problem-that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff repeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial-time algorithm. Our approach draws on the well-known ''folk theorem'' from game theory and shows how finite-state equilibrium strategies can be found efficiently and expressed succinctly.