Corporate finance and state enterprise reform in China [An article from: China Economic Review]
Book Details
Author(s)D. SU
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR2Z1I
ISBN-13978B000RR2Z13
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank99,999,999
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from China Economic Review, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper uses a novel approach in addressing two puzzles in the field of corporate finance in China, where government is a major player. In addition to the traditional approach based on agency theory and information asymmetry, the paper uses the political costs approach in studying the stock dividend puzzle and rights issues puzzle. The paper finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment, and institutional control affects corporate financing choices and dividend distribution decisions. The result sheds new light on improving the important corporate governance aspects of state enterprise reform in China.
Description:
This paper uses a novel approach in addressing two puzzles in the field of corporate finance in China, where government is a major player. In addition to the traditional approach based on agency theory and information asymmetry, the paper uses the political costs approach in studying the stock dividend puzzle and rights issues puzzle. The paper finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment, and institutional control affects corporate financing choices and dividend distribution decisions. The result sheds new light on improving the important corporate governance aspects of state enterprise reform in China.
