Informational effects of regulation FD: evidence from rating agencies [An article from: Journal of Financial Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)Jorion, P.
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR46LU
ISBN-13978B000RR46L4
AvailabilityIn Stock.
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Economics, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Regulation Fair Disclosure, implemented on October 23, 2000, prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, nonpublic disclosures to favored investment professionals. Regulation Fair Disclosure has a number of exclusions, however, including disclosure of nonpublic information to credit rating agencies. As a result, credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential information that is no longer made available to equity analysts, potentially increasing the information content of credit ratings. We examine the effect of credit rating changes on stock prices and find that the informational effect of downgrades and upgrades is much greater in the post-FD period.
Description:
Regulation Fair Disclosure, implemented on October 23, 2000, prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, nonpublic disclosures to favored investment professionals. Regulation Fair Disclosure has a number of exclusions, however, including disclosure of nonpublic information to credit rating agencies. As a result, credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential information that is no longer made available to equity analysts, potentially increasing the information content of credit ratings. We examine the effect of credit rating changes on stock prices and find that the informational effect of downgrades and upgrades is much greater in the post-FD period.
