The ''make or take'' decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity [An article from: Journal of Financial Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)R. Bloomfield, M. O'Hara, G. Saar
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR46RO
ISBN-13978B000RR46R4
MarketplaceCanada 🇨🇦
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Economics, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.
Description:
This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.
