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Two-levels of mental states attribution: from automaticity to voluntariness [An article from: Neuropsychologia]
Book Details
Author(s)G. Coricelli
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR4TLC
ISBN-13978B000RR4TL0
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank99,999,999
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Neuropsychologia, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
In this paper, I introduce the hypothesis that there are two levels of mindreading. The first level refers to automatic-preconceptual phenomena that specify a primitive understanding of another person's mind. It is based on early-imitation, action and emotion recognition. The second level of mindreading is conceptual and voluntary. It is based on intentionality, empathy, and higher depths of reasoning. The activities in both levels are generated by internal simulative mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on human and nonhuman neuroscientific evidence.
Description:
In this paper, I introduce the hypothesis that there are two levels of mindreading. The first level refers to automatic-preconceptual phenomena that specify a primitive understanding of another person's mind. It is based on early-imitation, action and emotion recognition. The second level of mindreading is conceptual and voluntary. It is based on intentionality, empathy, and higher depths of reasoning. The activities in both levels are generated by internal simulative mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on human and nonhuman neuroscientific evidence.
