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Axiomatization of the core of assignment games [An article from: Games and Economic Behavior]
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This digital document is a journal article from Games and Economic Behavior, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.
Description:
The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.
