![Multidimensional private value auctions [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0RR/bigB000RR89C2.jpg)
Multidimensional private value auctions [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)
H. Fang, S. Morris
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000RR89C2
ISBN-13
978B000RR89C9
Availability
Available for download now
Marketplace
United States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent's private valuation. We show that, in such environments, the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions (SPAs) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for the FPA. We also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents' valuation.
Description:
We consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent's private valuation. We show that, in such environments, the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions (SPAs) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for the FPA. We also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents' valuation.
