Are Congressional Black Caucus members more reliable? Loyalty screening and committee assignments of newly elected legislators.(The Political Economy ... American Journal of Economics and Sociology
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PublisherThomson Gale
ISBN / ASINB000S0THHE
ISBN-13978B000S0THH2
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This digital document is an article from The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, published by Thomson Gale on April 1, 2007. The length of the article is 6270 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
From the author: As previous research has suggested, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) demonstrates the characteristics of a well-functioning vote-producing cartel in both the degree and uniformity to which it supports the leadership of the Democratic Party in the U.S. House of Representatives. As previous work has pointed out, this cartel is, therefore, rewarded by House Democrats through selection for service on "important" committees at the beginning of each Congress. However, Democratic leaders have very little, if any, information to guide them in their choices regarding committee placement for newly elected Democratic representatives. As such, they are likely to use past CBC uniformity and loyalty as a low-cost screening device for predicting future reliability. Examination of the committee placement of newly elected Democrats to the U.S. House from the 103rd Congress through the 106th Congress reveals such a pattern by House Democratic leaders. In other words, newly elected CBC Democrats face much higher probabilities of receiving "important" committee assignments than their newly elected non-CBC counterparts, ceteris paribus.
Citation Details
Title: Are Congressional Black Caucus members more reliable? Loyalty screening and committee assignments of newly elected legislators.(The Political Economy of Politics)(Author abstract)
Author: Franklin G., Jr. Mixon
Publication:The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (Magazine/Journal)
Date: April 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Volume: 66 Issue: 2 Page: 413(19)
Article Type: Author abstract
Distributed by Thomson Gale
From the author: As previous research has suggested, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) demonstrates the characteristics of a well-functioning vote-producing cartel in both the degree and uniformity to which it supports the leadership of the Democratic Party in the U.S. House of Representatives. As previous work has pointed out, this cartel is, therefore, rewarded by House Democrats through selection for service on "important" committees at the beginning of each Congress. However, Democratic leaders have very little, if any, information to guide them in their choices regarding committee placement for newly elected Democratic representatives. As such, they are likely to use past CBC uniformity and loyalty as a low-cost screening device for predicting future reliability. Examination of the committee placement of newly elected Democrats to the U.S. House from the 103rd Congress through the 106th Congress reveals such a pattern by House Democratic leaders. In other words, newly elected CBC Democrats face much higher probabilities of receiving "important" committee assignments than their newly elected non-CBC counterparts, ceteris paribus.
Citation Details
Title: Are Congressional Black Caucus members more reliable? Loyalty screening and committee assignments of newly elected legislators.(The Political Economy of Politics)(Author abstract)
Author: Franklin G., Jr. Mixon
Publication:The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (Magazine/Journal)
Date: April 1, 2007
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Volume: 66 Issue: 2 Page: 413(19)
Article Type: Author abstract
Distributed by Thomson Gale
