U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Transnational Terror: Linking the U.S. Non-Proliferation Regime to Homeland Security Efforts - NBC, Nuclear Weapons, WMD, Iran, North Korea

The non-proliferation treaty regime the international community has utilized for over half a century is insufficient to combat emerging global threats, specifically, WMD terrorism. The current landscape of transnational terrorism requires a major shift in U.S. nonproliferation policies if the current regime is going to address WMD threats and the proliferation of weapons and materials by non-state actors adequately. From a policy perspective, nonproliferation and counterterrorism still largely operate as separate and distinct missions which creates a disconnect that can be exploited. Recent efforts have been instituted in an attempt to fill gaps but they still fall short because these measures operate in the absence of an overarching international framework, which results in the failure to capture fully the integration of the convergence of issues in the fields of counter-proliferation transnational terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. This thesis explores how the traditional non-proliferation policy regime can be connected to domestic homeland security efforts as an effective counter-terrorism strategy. It recommends a modern policy approach, including leveraging the non-proliferation framework already in existence, by supplementing with efforts to combat international criminal networks and overarching counterterrorism objectives to keep pace with current threats.

CHAPTER I - MAKING NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES RELEVANT TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM * A. EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH ISSUES OF PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM * B. THESIS OVERVIEW * 1. Problem Statement * 2. Argument/Hypothesis * 3. Research Questions * a. Primary Research Question * b. Secondary Questions * 4. Methodology * 5. Review of the Literature * C. ANALYSIS * D. ASSESSING THE THREAT * E. DEFINITIONS * F. DISCUSSION * G. EARLY COMMISSIONS RELATED TO THE TERRORISM THREAT * 1. The 9/11 Commission and WMD * H. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW * A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE LITERATURE REVIEW * B. CHALLENGES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME * C. PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION * D. THE INTERNATIONAL WMD NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: A REVIEW OF THE CORE DOCUMENTS AND TREATIES * 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty * 2. Governance Regimes to Contain Biological and Chemical Weapons * 3. The Biological Weapons Convention * 4. The Chemical Weapons Convention * E. TERRORISM IN THE PROLIFERATION LITERATURE * F. 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW * G. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS * 1. UN Resolutions 1540 and 1977 * 2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 * H. TRENDS IDENTIFIED IN LITERATURE REGARDING WMD ATTACK * I. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS VS. WMD WEAPONS * J. CONCLUSION * CHAPTER III - THE THREAT OF WMD TERRORISM—WHO, WHY AND HOW CAPABLE. IS IT REALISTIC TO THINK THAT TERRORISTS WOULD GO NUCLEAR? * A. THE NEXUS BETWEEN PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM * B. NUCLEAR MATERIALS: THE KEY INGREDIENTS * 1. HEU vs. Plutonium: The Preferred Terrorist Ingredient * C. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS * D. WHO WOULD DO IT? * E. WMD UNDER AL QAEDA' S NEW LEADERSHIP * 1. Motivation * 2. Strategic and Tactical Considerations * F. CAPABILITY VS. INTENT—DO THEY MATCH? * G. THE GROWING RISKS * 1. Nuclear Black Markets * 2. The Convergence between WMD-related Material Trafficking and Transnational Criminal Organizations * H. STATES OF CONCERN—COUNTRY PROFILES * 1. Pakistan * 2. North Korea * 3. Iran * 4. Russia and the Former Soviet Republics * 5. Libya * 6. Afghanistan * 7. Syria * I. CONCLUSION * CHAPTER IV - CURRENT CHALLENGES IN PROLIFERATION AS RELATED TO WMD TERRORISM * A. THREAT CONVERGENCE * B. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE RISE OF NON-STATE ACTORS * C. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION NETWORKS * D. THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION * E. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND KNOWLEDGE DISTRIBUTION * F. DETERRENCE MAY NOT BE AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR NON-STATE ACTORS * G. CREDIBILITY AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES * H. THE DIFFICULTY WITH WMD INTELLIGENCE * I. CONCLUSION * CHAPT