Horten Ho 229 Illustrated

Modern mechanized warfare is characterized by a high level of mobility and lethality. Recent conflicts like the 1973 Yom Kippur War prove this to be true. Future conflicts will also be characterized by high levels of mobility and firepower accompanied by high loss rates on both sides. The three major armed forces of the world today, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, have all made significant investments in upgrading the power and speed of their armored and mechanized forces. The overall impact of this fact is that major land battles will continue to be characterized by intense combat and a critical requirement by opposing armies to replace losses with reserve forces and rush them into action.
Battlefield Air Interdiction is that portion of direct air support to the land battle intended to cut off this critical re- supply of forces to the main battle. The United States Air Force's doctrine of Battlefield A1r Interdiction 1s not yet fully developed. This is true for several reasons which have their roots in the United States military policy since the end of World War II. First, the United States' reliance on a nuclear strategy during the 1950's and early 1960's deemphasized the need for the development of doctrine 1n the employment of large conventional land forces. Second, 1n the I960's and 1970's, the military establishment was involved in the conflict in Viet Nam and still had not given adequate doctrinal thought to the employment of ground forces on a scale necessary to counter the growing Warsaw Pact conventional capability. Recent realization of this threat has forced us to address doctrine seriously.
The experiences of the Luftwaffe during World War II in the Battle of Kursk can illuminate the problems of large conventional forces, heavily supported by airpower, locked in decisive battle so critical that the survival of nations is at stake. Robert Ehrhart, in a recent article in Air University Review wrote, "Without an awareness of what airpower has done - and has not been able to do - doctrine would have to be derived solely from hypotheses, from educated guesses about the capabilities of air forces ... Past experience provides the substance for doctrine." [1] Furthermore, some aspects of Soviet doctrine have remained constant since the end of World War II.
Current Soviet doctrine for offensive operations calls for the echelonment of forces to discover the enemy's weak point, penetrate the enemy line, attack vulnerable rear areas, and disrupt the entire network of defense. The Soviets may divide forces into breakthrough and follow-on echelons. Follow-on echelons normally are characterized by higher mobility than first echelons. This mobility 1s required not only immediately after breakthrough is accomplished but also to provide the lateral movement on the battlefield necessary to carry out exploitation of rear areas of the enemy's defense. Soviet defensive doctrine is also characterized by the echelonment of forces; not only in the positioning of defenses prepared in depth, but also in the retention of significant counterattack forces at all echelons. The Soviets will attempt to penetrate enemy lines with a division along a four to seven kilometer frontage. Such a breakthrough, given current force dispositions in Central Europe, might be faced by a NATO force of only battalion size (assuming a standard- size NATO division defending along a fifty kilometer front). Penetration would be initiated by a first-echelon Soviet division, possibly followed by a second-echelon division, possibly followed by the divisions of second-echelon army.[2] The interdiction of these follow-on echelons will be critical. Air Force airpower at the present time is the only conventional force which can be applied effectively against echeloned Soviet forces.