21st Century Essential Guide to Agricultural Terrorism, Agroterrorism, Agriterrrorism, Bioweapons, Pathogens, Food, Plants, Livestock (CD-ROM)

This up-to-date and comprehensive electronic book on CD-ROM presents an incredible collection of important documents, reports, and publications from the federal government about agricultural terrorism, termed either “agriterrorism” or “agroterrorism” by bioweapons experts. There is extensive material from the FDA, CDC, U.S. Department of Agriculture, EPA, along with Senate hearings and additional technical and scientific information. The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability. Attacks against agriculture are not new, and have been conducted or considered by both nation-states and substate organizations throughout history. The results of an agroterrorist attack may include major economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, loss of confidence in government, and possibly human casualties. Humans could be at risk in terms of food safety or public health, especially if the chosen disease is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). Public opinion may be particularly sensitive to a deliberate outbreak of disease affecting the food supply. Public confidence in government could be eroded if authorities appear unable to prevent such an attack or to protect the population’s food supply. Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems for managing the threat. Agricultural production is geographically disbursed in unsecured environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations, and then transported and commingled with other herds. Pest and disease outbreaks can quickly halt economically important exports. Many veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal diseases that are resilient and endemic in foreign countries. Senator Susan Collins has commented: “Al Qaeda’s interest in agriculture is not limited to studying documents. These killers have practical, hands-on knowledge. A CIA report released in May confirmed that the September 11 hijackers expressed interest in crop dusting aircraft, an effective and remarkably simple way to spread biological agents, including plant and animal diseases, over large areas. We have also learned from the CIA that Osama bin Laden himself has considerable knowledge of agriculture. He controlled sunflower and corn markets in the Sudan in the mid-1990’s and may have used his farms to train terrorist operatives. Last spring, a Saudi cleric who supports al Qaeda and has since been arrested issued a fatwa, a religious ruling, that justified the use of chemical and biological weapons, including weapons that destroy tillage and stock. To appreciate the potential impact of agroterrorism, consider the economic and social impacts of naturally occurring events of agricultural disease outbreaks. Here are just three examples. The 1997 outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Taiwan had an immediate cost to farmers of $4 billion. The estimated cost to date of trade embargoes is $15 billion. The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Great Britain cost $1.6 billion in compensation to farmers. The lost revenue to tourism, a manifestation of the psychological impact, is estimated at $4 billion. The 2002 outbreak of exotic Newcastle disease in California led to huge economic losses for poultry farmers and the quarantine of 46,000 square miles. Included in this area was the U.S. Army National Training Center at Fort Irwin. But to call these three cases naturally occurring ignores an important point. Each was caused by human error, by carelessness, by a lapse in security. In Taiwan, it was one infected pig imported from Hong Kong. In Britain, it was one batch of infected feed at one farm. In California, it was one infected roo